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NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY POLICY 
Contribuição do autor, como Presidente do Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa, 
de Itália, proposta no decurso da Conferência de Comandantes dos Colégios de 
Defesa da NATO que teve lugar em Berna, no período de 22 a 24 de Março de 
1995, e na qual participou o Dircctor do Instituto da Defesa Nacional (IDN). 
Resumo: 
O artigo é iniciado por um ensaio da definição conceptual de «interesse 
Nacional» procurando distinguir entre o que é e o que não é, considerado como 
tal, do ponto de vista da sua natureza, dimensão e relacionamento com o 
interesse colectivo. Em seguida, o autor analisa os conceitos de poder, segurança 
nacional e segurança colectiva, nos períodos anterior e posterior à bipolarização 
das relações internacionais. Por último, tendo presente o contexto da segurança 
ocidental e internacional, levanta uma hipótese de enumeração dos interesses 
nacionais da Itália, estabelecendo a sua relação com a política de segurança e 
com as Forças Armadas. 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
When one speaks of national interests it is like venturing anta a minefield. 
In faet, the term ean be used with a myriad meanings, as occurs with the word 
«nation». 
There has reeently been a rctum to diseussion ar national interests, due 
also to the importanee whieh the «national>, question has assumed in domestic 
polities. Censorial eritieism of Ihis debale has not been laeking, as though only 
10 speak af national interests is indicative af «regression» as compared to a 
«more modem» eoneepl of polities, based on lhe primaey of widespread loeal, 
regional ar even international concems. 
It has been claimed that nalional interests have no <<national>, basis, ànd 
are merely the produel of diplomatie and military bureauerats who, jealous of 
their own speeifie roles, lend to render the positions of their respective 
countries unilateral. Others. inslead, have identified Italy's primary national 
interests with the simple predisposition of efficient inslruments of foreign 
policy and seeurity, Ihus - in a cerlain sense - inverling lhe ratio of priority 
aims, that is to say interests, and diplomatic, inlelligence, military, economic 
and inslitutional means (although, obviously, aims and means inleract and, 
without effieient instruments, no significam aim can be proposed). 
Others maintain thal European States no longer have national interests bul 
that these have been replaced by collective European interests. But can 
interests exisl without being expressed by polilieal entities? No supra-national 
European entity actually exists. Fundamental deeisions are made by lhe 
European Couneil, that is an intergovemmental body which eannot define ar 
impose interests ar polieies olher than Ihose resulting from the component 
interests and policies of the membcr states. 
It goes without saying that sueh claims arise from precise politieal, 
cultural and ideological intercsts and policies. even i f they may not, in some 
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cases, be confessed to, Sometimes they are simply stratagems to disguise what 
one intends to do ar to remove fram any form of externaI control what has 
already been dane, These, as Lorenzo Ornaghi states, are the leftovers fram a 
«party democracy», rather than the «citizens democracy» which is, with some 
difficulty, establishing itself in our country, 
Before speaking of national interests, it is necessary to define their 
meaning, nature and relationship with collective interests, which fonn the basis 
of alliances, ar international interests which often reflect the general values 
and principIes of co-existence, 
I am firmly convinced not only of the existence of national interests but 
also of the need for these to be defined, This both for the planning and 
contingent management of foreign and security policies, as in the case also of 
military policy, and also so that these are not removed fram the field of 
discussion and democratic contraI as though they belong, instead, to a separate 
field of «royal prerogative», a convenient screen for the self-determination of 
bureaucracy, 
This conviction is strengthened by the fact lhal, now that the «fog» of the 
«warm peace» has replaced the certainties of the «cold waf» and lhe disorder 
of Nations, the order ofYalta, the material and political costs of ltaly's foreign 
and security policies must inevitably rise, It will, therefore, be necessary to 
have public consensus, and far more so than in the helle époque of the 'bipolar 
world, Citizens must be interested in foreign affairs and be aware of the 
problems to be faced, of the alternative aptians opcn and of their advantages, 
risks, costs and implications also in home affairs, 
We must learn to avoid the conveniently distracting debate on systems and 
deal with concrete details, Only in this way will we be able to evaluate those 
national interests which the political élites propose as essential elements in 
their political pragrammes and for which, once in govemment, they will be 
accountable in the face of the opposition and of the voters, 
Foreign policy cannot be limited to the deelaration of principIes and 
values, but must evaluate the effective consequences of specific choices, lt 
must have a real elhic base, what Max Weber called «lhe ethics of responsi-
bility» rather than a false ethical stance, such as that of abstract principIes and 
values which are normally litt\e more than screens behind which one may do 
as he wants. 
We must stop seeing peace as a kind of acquired right, established by 
Artiele 1I of the Constitution but, in fact, dependant on the behaviour of other 
actors in the international scene. We must no longer boast, to the amusement, 
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bewilderment or disdain of our foreign counterparts, of being a disarmed 
nation or of considering our Armed Forces as instruments of war rather than 
seeing them as increasingly indispensible for whatever kind of peace may be 
possible. This is still a political peace which corresponds to our interests, our 
values and our vision of what the international system should be. 
We must stop applying the rhetoric of the «soldiers of peace», implying 
by contrast the «bad» soldiers of the cold war, who were those who kept Italy 
tirmly anchored to the West. Both are or have been soldiers of the Italian 
Republic, and that is alI. 
We must abandon the rhetorie of humanitarian patriolism and our fantasies 
of how Italy dlffers in some way fram the rest of the West, fantasies in which 
can be heard the echoes of ali lhe messianic and megalomaniac templations of 
bolh Italy's eolonialism and her missionarian attitude towards the Third World. 
Such rhetoric would like to give Italy a universal mission in the name of a 
moral primacy which nobody has recognized but whieh lends to transform the 
Foreign Ministry into a UN agency and the Defenee into a braneh of the 
lntemational Red Cross. 
We must slop seeing Italy in an ambiguous posilion between, tirsl, Easl 
and Wesl and now between Norlh and Soulh with «natural» mediating roles 
which no one has asked of us and which we have neilher the material nor the 
cultural and moral weight to perform. 
Italy's position in the Wesl and wilh Western values is an eslablished facl, 
and has no longer the need 01' lhe mediation of Atlanticism, anti-Fascism ar 
anti-communism. National-neUlralist tendences do noL exisL in Italy, ar are 
negligible, nor is there any destabilizing desire in the regional picture, not even 
on our eastem borders. Of this our allies must be certain and should be 
guaranteed. The problem Iies not in Ilaly's belonging lo Europe and lhe Wesl 
bUl in what role the country elTeelively intends to perform in Europe and in the 
West. 
BUl having a role means defining interests, priorilies and, possibly, as 
indieated by Carlo Maria Santora, preferencial geopolitical directions and 
areas of interest. 
We should, by the way, criticize the general aspiration to «having an 
internationaJ role» in itself. In realilY, this transforrns Lhe aim inta a means and 
leads to a mere <dunch presence diplomacy» lhat disguises lhe lack of a foreign 
policy. «Being therc» is nol an end in itself. The «role» is secondary to the 
interests to be pursued. We belong lo the European Union not so as to bring 
about European unily but lo proteet our interests bCller through common action 
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aimed at achieving single, common goals, not only that of having Europe as 
a benefit unto itself. Whilst a Europe of Nations is acceptable, a Europe of the 
kind proposed by German geopoliticians in the twenties and thirties would 
certainly not be. In this framework it can occur, in fact, that we take on a role 
(initiative, break, balance, medi ator, etc.) but there is no sense in clinging to 
such a ro le at any cost. 
The assertion that general European interests exist which differ from 
national interests (which, moreover, cannot be debated or controlled by the 
public) tends to diminish the weight of Italian participation in the International 
community or, more correctly speaking, in the world. At most, one could talk 
of «wider» national interests which are congruent with those of our European 
partners after having agreed on these or, rather, haggled even strongly over 
them as ali national representativcs should do, be they politicians, diplomats or 
members of the Armed Forces. 
Defining Italian national interests should represent a clear duty on the part 
of those who wish to governo Not to do so would mean ignoring one's 
responsibility and Iimiting the control of both the opposition and the voters 
over government action in foreign policy. 
In sue h a manner we produce precisely that «disinterest» on the part of the 
public and the political powers about which we so ritually complain, but which 
is frequently mentioned in justification of the routine bureaucratic anu diplo-
matic nature of foreign policy decisions. In arder to overcome lhis, it seems to 
me essential that we recover the meaning af «national interests». 
This study is in four sections. In the first the concept of national interests 
is examined and, in the second, that oI' security. In the third section I examine 
the problem of Italy's position and international role following the end of the 
bipolar world both within and oulside our country. In lhe fourth section, I 
outline a hypothesis as to what could be the national interests of Italy and those 
of its security. These latter, I hasten to add here so as to avoid any misunder-
standing, are not autarkic but should be considered in the context of western 
and international security. A sketch will also be given oI' the characteristics 
which institutional, intelligence, operative, economic and, in particular, mili-
tary means should consequently have in order to satisfy the requirements of 
such interests of the current international context. 
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NATIONAL INTERESTS 
WHAT IS ANO WHAT 15 NOT A «NATIONAL INTEREST»? 
States still represent the fundamental elements in the current international 
system. This is reaffirmed also in the document An Agenda for Peace by the 
Secretary General of the United Nations. They constitute, therefore, a prius; 
lhey are where politics happen. They allocate also authoritatively values, 
projects and objeclives. It is, in fact, within states thal consensus is formed and 
the democratic participation of cilizens finds expression. In an ever «nar-
rower», «fuIler» and «interdependant» world, the definitin af one's Qwn 
nalional interests must, of necessity, take into accounl the national interesls of 
other slates. But the national inlerest constilute a logical priorilY of any foreign 
policy or any form of presence in international organizations. 
National interests express the wider choices of foreign policy aimed at 
guaranteeing the prosperity and security of the citizens and maintaining the 
values and world view that a state wishes to assert eilher in cooperation or in 
competition with other states. 
Deriving from the definition of Italian national interests - for example, 
European integration or stability in lhe Medilerranean - we have the objec-
tives, planning and organic managemenl of lhe entire foreign policy, of which 
security is a part, contingent decisions in times af crisis, emergency ar conflict. 
and the «genetic» planning af necessary means. 
These lasl cannol be defined in abslr.cl lerms bul musl be seen in relalion 
lo objectives lhal we inlend lo achieve. AI lhe most, if the polilico-inslilulional 
system were nol capable of dealing adequalely with llalian parlicipalion in 
military intervention abroad, il would even be preferable nol to have rapid 
inlervenlion forces so as nol to be obliged lo inlervene, in a secondary role, by 
lhe pressure of lhe internalional communily or our more powerful allies. This, 
in a cerlain sense, is what Germany and Japan have done so far, hiding behind 
a debatable conslitucional velo on the employment of lheir forces abroad. 
The pursuil of nalional interests, therefore, does not in any way imply 
militarism, autarchy, neutralism, nationalism, overweening ambition ar impe-
rialism. lt contlicts with neither multilateralism nor participation in temporary 
or permanent alliances. It does not exclude the possibility of creating 
supranational institutions which, however, are to be considered such only if 
they have the formal and substancial legitimacy with which to allocate 
forcefully values, objectives and policies. The detining of national interests is 
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an essencial element in giving unity to foreign policy, that is, to the system of 
international relations of one state and which, within that slate, represents the 
basis for the preparation of how and with what means this should function. 
Clearly, the definition may be more ar less explicit ar implicit: a degree 
of ambiguity is always necessary and this will be greater in long-term planning 
than in the management of foreign policy. lt would be extremely difficult to 
reach an agreement if one's own interests were defined in such detail as to 
render them inflexible and, therefore, non-negotiable. In the case of serious 
contrasts with other states, this ambiguity becomes a factor of power given that 
it leaves lhe adversary uncertain as to one's aims and moves. Even within 
alliances a limited unpredictability, in certain areas, can represem a means of 
increasing one's own weight as, generally, can one's dependability. Studies on 
this subject abound. National interests vary fram year to year and from 
administration to administration. What they really are may be deduced by 
interpreting the constant factors, by logically connecting these and by exam-
ining the power relationship and decisions taken in economic or military 
policy. 
An analysls of this kind reveals that, during the Cold War period, \laly 
pursued very elear, precise and constam national interests in terms not only of 
the broader choices (democracy, free market, Europe, the Atlantic Alliance 
etc.), but also in variances with respect to the interests and policies of ner mos I 
important allies (Mattei: milli-ostpolitik; a low prafile nol so much to keep 
hands elean as to keep them free; Libya; Sigonella; etc.). This so as to exploit 
opportunities for freedom of action in the world with the aim of increasing our 
weight in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, priority areas of our inlemational 
presence. 
The basic problem is that of the debate, analysis and internai explication 
of the aims being pursued in such a way as to define them, this time very 
elearly, for diplomats and whoever else represems and works for the state in 
international meetings. These musl know what is wanled, what strategies to 
adopt to achieve these aims, how far they may go or how much concede in 
negotialions in which higher principies are not under discussion but, rather. 
interests are exchanged. 
To a cenain extent, it is inevitable and, perhaps, for the best that national 
interests are implicit; but we have gane toa far, to lhe point that we have 
actually lost sight of them. To some degree they must be rendered more explicit 
and each question, great ar small, must be discussed, above ali in terms of 
national interests. This must be made very elear to those operaling in lhe 
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diplomatic, military and economic-financial fields. Where do the interests of 
the nation Iie: in the Balkans? In the European Union? In energetic policy? In 
ecology? In immigration? In a common agricultural policy? Does it make 
sense to pay Europe annually 1500-2000 billion Iire more than we receive? 
The answers, cJearly, are multifold; lhe choice depends on the scale of priority. 
For example, one interest Iies in obtaining indemnily for ltalian property in 
Slovenia and Croatia. But how great is this compared to other interests which 
could thereby be damaged? The scale of priority and consideration of interests 
is not fixed lhen, but alters according to changes in the mixture of problems 
and the period concerned. 
It was, to a certain extent, justified not to speak of Italian interests during 
the Cold War. Not speaking of them, in fact, was essencial to the aim of making 
two irreconcilable facts co-exist: membership of the western Alliance and the 
internai consociate situation. This phase is, however, now ovcr. Italy can no 
longer be, at one and the same time, both allied and neutral, co-belligerent and 
non-belligerent. desirous of being present in world decision-mak.ing fora bul 
against taking on burdens and responsibilities, 
ltaly can no longer be lhe friend of everyone but must cJarify, first Df ali 
to herself, her interests and try to pursue them. 
Wilh the end Df the Cold War and the Maastricht Treaty the belle époque 
of irresponsibility and impunity has come to an end, as the Ambassador Sergio 
Romano has said. Decisions must be made, including those which involve 
renouncing certam things and we must provi de ourselves with the ability to 
make them. We can no longer delegate foreign policy, which consists more of 
many small decisions lhan of greal choices, to others. 
Ali the elements exist for an Italian «reawakening» to this questiono In 
arder to be involved in foreign polities and stay in the West it was necessary 
to reform the economy, the administration and, therefore, the internaI political 
system. The transformations currentJy underway in our country are creating the 
basis on which Italy can become a slate like the others, capable of defining its 
own interests without strange shows of modesty and 01' discussing them 
calmly, without indulging in passing fashions of the kind that caused us to 
abandon nuclear energy or to destroy the technological and industrial founda-
lioos of our defence with a policy 50 violently opposed to the exporlation of 
armaments as to sometimes make Doe doubt whether or nal there was collusion 
with foreign competitors. 
109 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
WHO DEFINES NATIONAL INTERESTS? 
National interests do not derive from externai factors bul from the political 
and therefore voluntary choices of the élire in power. These, il is to be 
understood, are Iimited both by the resources available or which can be 
mobilized in time and by the structures of the international syslem, lhat is by 
the divergence or convergence of one's own interests and vision of the world 
with those of other states wilh whom we inleracl. The choice is then limited 
by rei ative power relalionships, not only in materiallerms (military, economic, 
etc.) but also in terms of image, reliability, credibility and proposal-making 
ability. 
National interests are of a poli ti cal nature and are defined by the political 
élite in power. Competition between interests always exists. One need only 
think 01' how many have intervened in detining ltalian policy in the case of 
Yugoslavia, also at a local and corporative leveI. Regions, industry and panies 
ali make foreign policy. The problem is that, with us, lhere is no discussion and 
things therefore gel confused. You always see only one side of things and an 
overall vision is lacking which would enable us to seule sectorial visions and 
interests. This demonstrates a lack of a culture of government, poorly dis-
guised by the bureaucratic reflexes of the Farnesina, ar the statements by 
polilicians responsible for the Ministry that the ltalians have no personal 
interests. This, in the best of hypotheses, is merely a joke ar case 01' leg-
-pulling. To place in doubt a national interest is not, therefore, lO belray lhe 
country. Ralher, il is necessary that this be done. It is fundamental to any 
demooratic dialeclic. lt is the basis for lhal consensus which gives legitimacy 
to and renders functional any political project, nO! only at home but also in 
relation lo olhe r stales. 
National inlerests are, in foreign politics, what in domestic POlilics are 
called general, public interests, ar for the common good. They should repre-
sent a component in any proposal or political «formula» or electoral pro-
gramme. The lack of inleresl in foreign and security politics which was 
revealed in recent elections derives both from cultural inadequacies, cultivated 
in the period of the Cold War, and from the urgency and presumed or real 
priority of institutional and economic internai problems. Once the political 
syslem senles down it will become indispensible in ltaly to pass from 
disinterestedness to interest, if nothing else because of the growing levei of 
globalization and interdependency. 
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Obviously, in a state which is a state, thal is which is based on a 
fundamental understanding between majority and opposition with regard to the 
rules of lhe game, there are interests which are shared by ali lhe political 
parties sue h as guaranteeing territorial inlegrity, energy supplies, freedom of 
movement and so on. Italy's position as belonging to the West and to Europe 
is beyond doubt. There are, however, different options open, such as how to be 
in Europe and the world. A debate should be opened on these since each of 
them has a different impact on internai politics and on the life of lhe citizens. 
Defining interests with the term «national» is not necessarily Cas has been 
said) a hypocritical way of passing off as general what are really sectorial or 
particular interests or, even, merely ideological options. It is simply a 
convencional term which derives from the fact that any «political formula» in 
the sense attributed by Duverger, aims at representing its own values, projects 
and programmes as corresponding to lhe general inlerests 01' ali citizens. If lhis 
were not the case, it would change them. The term national is fu11y acceptable 
since it obliges those who use it to reason inm terms 01' the state and not of the 
corporation, group ar region to which they belong. 
The nation, moreover, is not a natural, organic ar pre-existing entity, above 
lhe state or wilh its own «natural» ar «divinc» interests as was c1aimed by the 
organic theories of the State or postulated by the Gcrman Haushoferian schoal 
of Geapalitik. 
The state is not merely an instrument 01' the nation af, as Mancini 
alfirmed, it is not only lhe legal system 01' a pre-existing nation. The nation is, 
as Renan said in a marve110us expression a «plebiscite 01' every day», the 
ideological and symbolic substrata which expresses lhe wi11 01' the citizens to 
live together, the basis of the so-called «patriotism of the constitutioo». Nor is 
it \!,ue, ". Albertini maintained, that the nation is «only a stratagem of the 
state», an ideology and a mylh, basis of its legitimacy and the consensus of lhe 
citizens and also ethical point of reference for that kind of civil priesthood 
which is the civil service. The «natioo» is not simple propaganda. It is lhe 
cultural and historical substrata of the State. There are nations without 
statehood which aspire to this status just as there are nations which are c1early 
the product of the state. In the case of Italy, as in Germany and France, both 
cases are true. It is for this reason lhat. in a certain sense, we today rnay 
overturn the statement «having created Italy, we must create lhe Italians». The 
Italians exist, we must instead reconstruct Italy, that is to say the state. Interest 
in foreign policy is delined as national because, on the international scene, the 
state tends to act as a unitary and coherent system, thus personified by the 
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government in power which makes lIse of the administrative apparatus, the 
diplomatic corps and the Armed Forces. 
Unanimity is not necessary for a delinition of national interests which, it 
does well to repcat, are not objective or deterministic and do not fali outside 
the limits ar values of politics. The rules of politics apply. Those who hold 
power, that is the majority, govern and therefore define this power. The 
minority controls and prepares itself to govern, becoming the majority in the 
next round of elections. Attempting to find unanimity at any cost leads to 
immobilization of the nation. 
This, it should be clear, does not mean that the widest consensus should 
not be sought, especially in foreign policy but also in domestic policy, nor that, 
once a decision has been made, tbe minority is no longe r obliged to respect the 
rules 01' the game. In other words, it is not Iegitimate to sabotage forcign policy 
ar action of the government by looking for foreign allies. The political struggle 
between majority and minority is not a game without prizes, especially in 
foreign politics. Largely overlapping interests exist which must be taken into 
account, not taking the internaI political struggle abroad so as not to wcaken 
lhe position af the «country system» on lhe intcrnational scenc. 
THE NATURE AND DlMENSIONS OF NATIONAL lNTERESTS 
National interests can be c\assi!ied in various ways which here we will 
merely list, leaving to more specialized literature any eventual in-depth study. 
In the lirst place, thesc interests ean be classi!ied aceording to their nature: 
eeonomie, territorial, political, ideological. This classifieation obviously refcrs 
us to lhe aims pursued: well-being, security and assertion of ane's own vision 
oI' history, the world and humanity, that is to say the values which crcate the 
basis for thc coexistence and culture of eaeh population. They mainly relate to 
thc role whieh it is felt necessary ar convenient to play and concepts regarding 
those dcsirable structures of the international system which it is the intention 
to safeguard ar crcate through one's own action. 
Secondly, national interests can be c1assilied aecording to priority as vital 
or secondary (the recent White Paper by the French Defence defines them as 
«strategic»), according to their permanency as permanent ar variable and, 
according to their size as general af specitic. 
Thirdly, with reference to the interests of other countries, national inte-
resls can be considered as common, complementary Of conflictual. Considera-
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tion of these aspeets in relation to other countries is necessary for the planning 
01' foreign poliey and decisions eoneerning war and peaee in whieh the state 
pursues its own interests. It is also of use in cooperation ar alliance agreements 
whieh give weight to eommon interests through eommon policy. Allianees or, 
at least, multilateralism are only means of pursuing national interests more 
economically and effectively. These, it goes without saying, influenee the 
definition af interests. For example where there is a pre-eminent interest, a 
state may give up one of its specilic interests which is in contrast and 
irreconeilable with this general priority interest. This must, however, be a 
voluntary decision, on the assumption of the priority af the national interest in 
maintaining the alliance's eohesion as compared to other potentially eonflietual 
interests. It is therefore entireiy wrong to see national imerests and multilateralism 
in contrast, as has reeently been the ease in Italy. The definition of national 
interests is used, finally, for diplomatic negotiations which tend to settle 
contlicts and conciliate partially overlapping divergent interests by «swap-
ping» one's own interest with that Df another state. Only when it retlects and 
expresses an effective and realistic scale Df priorities for national interests can 
multilateralism really work or alliances achieve a high levei of ability and 
reliability. 
Fourthly, national interesls can be long - or short-term. The time factoris 
important in politics as in strategy. There is often a contradiclion between 
shorl-term and long-Ierm inleresls wich necessilales lhe exercising Df difticull 
political choices given lhal political «times» vary and are generally much 
shorler than those 01' interests. 
Fifthly, inlerests can also be indirecI, that is to say instrumental in the 
pursuit of completely differcnt interests. This is lhe case, for example, when 
interests have the aim of consolidating the international image Df lhe country 
and reinforcing its weighl, credibilily and reliability. For example, the expedi-
tion to the Crimea 01' the Armata Sarda or the inlerventions in Somalia and 
Mozambique are justified by the respective needs 01' submitting the ltalian 
national question to the «concerto» oI' European powers and Df supporting 
ltaly's request to inerease her presenee in the Security Council of lhe United 
Nations. There are also, lastly, «historieah> interests which ean be debated as 
mueh as you wish but whieh are, in effeet, at the rool Df many of the eurrent 
ethnie and national contliets. «Historieal rights» sueh as those proclaimed by 
lhe Serbs or by lraq in relation to Kuwait (and which «Civiltà eatloliea» itself 
eonsidered legitimate), however instrumental Ihey may seem, nonetheless have 
a real effeeliveness which cannol be ignored by other states and can form the 
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basis for internaI and international consensus. Interests sustained by the 
various deterministic geopolitical schools of thought are analogous, such as 
those relating to natural frontiers, vital space, manifest destiny, as are those 
mercantile theories of «sacred egoism» or the various fundamentalist religious 
and ideological movements which lie at the root of so many holy wars, 
crusades and world wars. 
INTERESTS ANO PQWER 
An interest can be considered as sue h only if one is capable of achieving 
it, that is if one has the power needed to do so. If not, then we are not dealing 
with interests but simply with aspirations that are unrealistically ambitious and 
dangerous. 
The range of interests depends, therefore, on the extent of power that can 
be wielded. Power undergoes a weakening process with«distance». not 
distance in the spatial sense but psychological, historiea!. temporal and so on. 
Tcehnology in particular informatics, telecommunications. transport and wea-
pons systems, have an intluence on the gradient of «power reduction by 
distance». According to sector (for example, economic and military) totally 
different «gradients» exist, often charactcrized by large gaps (the economic 
scctor is less continuous than the security scctor. for example). 
A similar phenomenon of wcakening, described by Boulding, affects 
perceptions and, therefore, interests. A tribal contlict broadcast by the media 
throughout the world has far more impact on public opinion and, consequently, 
on polítical deeisions than another even bloodier contlict which does not 
receive such coverage. This, on the one hand, leaves the way open to ali kinds 
of manipulation and misinformation and, on the other, has sometimes led to 
«video-politics». This provokes uncoordinated and improvised reactions which 
makes politicians who have taken lhe initiative prisioners af their own actions, 
creating interests based on image and an unreasonable escalation in the use of 
force. This effect is to be distinguished from the mere amateurism or lack of 
serious and systematic action which was made palpable when certain ltalian 
politicans, interviewed by a geopolitical magazine, revealed themselves to 
have an exceedingly vague idea of not only human but also physical geogra-
phy. With signs almost of irritation, they pushed away the map that the 
interviewer was attempting to show them so as to bring the discussion down 
to concrete terms. Instead, they Iimited themselves to a repetition of general 
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and inane banalities, confirming by contrast the old saying «God is in the 
details, not in general ideas». 
As in the case of interests, power is also of a multidimensianal nature. 
Among its various elements there exisls a certain fungibilily, such as between 
economic and military factors. This varies from case to case and cannot be 
defined in lhe abstracl but only in relation to individual concrete cases. 
Power is, first and foremost, of an institutional nature. States must be able 
to plan their foreign policy in an organic and coherent manner and manage 
crises, emergencies and contlicts. This ability is particularIy lacking in !taly, 
characterized as it is in its coalition govemments, by a worrying lack af 
coordination and uncommunicative relations between the Foreign and Defence 
ministries. 
Power has also a symbolic naturc. The credibility, prestige and reliability 
of a state and the predictability of its behaviour represent the basis for its 
effective weight on the international scene. These are multiplying factors of 
power which cannot be replaced by any amount of material, economic or 
military force. The image of power often plays a greater role in foreign policy 
than power itself. In this area also, Haly is particularly lacking, given the 
weakness of those of ils organizalions which are concerned wilh institutional 
information. 
Thirdly, power presupposes lhe existence of intelligence capabilities. 
These have become still more essencial in recent times given the uncertainty 
which characterizes the existing intemalional system, the existence of wide-
spread risks, unprediclable threats and the shrinking of the time factors. In this 
sector also, it goes without saying, we lind ourselves lackig thanks also to the 
fact that our intelligence services have come to be secn as demonic. 
Fourthly, power and, therefore, the breadth of interests, are dependant on 
the availability of adequate operational - diplomatic, military and economic -
instruments. Here again the !talian situation is not exactly rosy. 
Ali these shortcomings have led Ambassador Romano lo claim that Italian 
national interests should consist principally of the preparation of means 
essential to Italy's intemational presence and actions. Only after having put our 
house in order may we talk of externai Halian national interests. 
Such a claim can be shared only in part and, one could add, at a more 
basic levei, there is the need to recover a sense of the operational culture of the 
state. However, our levei of power is not nihil; we must, though, live in an 
international system which is rapidly evolving and which could leave us on the 
edges also in the new international division of tasks. We can no longer delegate 
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our security to others as we could in the time of the Cold War. We cannot go 
from delegating to the United States to delegating to Europe for the simple 
rcason that Europe does not exisl: it exists as a market, nol as a statc. 
The delinition of national interests and projects is necessary also because 
the consensos necessary for sustaining the political and tinancial costs of 
preparation and the use of these instruments can only be aequired through the 
proposal of programmes, roles and aims. Finally, there is always a logieal 
priority oI' the ends ave r the means, and of the aims we hope to aehieve over 
the means necessary in arder to pursue them. We will, in the short term, have 
to set ourselves madest objectives 80 as to measure our interests against 
available abilities ave r time, gradually extending our interests as the means to 
aehieve them are eonsolidated but preparing these means specifieally in 
relation to those objectives, that is to pre-determined interests. 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
WHAT IS SECURITY? 
The concept of seeurity is, Iike those of interests and power, a multi-
dimensional eoncept. It does not relate merely to the military diinension 
although, during the Cold War period, the threat oI' a Soviet invasion raised this 
aspect to pre-eminenec as compared to political and non-military aspeets. 
Security is concerned with ali threats, risks and dangers which may come 
into conllict with ar impede the carrying out oI' politieal aims, tirst among 
which that oI' living and prospering in peaee and aftirming one's own values. 
Vital security interests exist, such as one's own territorial integrity and that 
oI' one's allies, the independence of one's politics, the protection of one's own 
citizens whilst abroad and freedom oI' movement and sea Iines of communica-
tion. There are also non-military threats, such as ecological or economic 
threats, drugs, organized crime, massive immigration, violations af interna-
tional arder and rights, underdevelopment etc. These are usually dealt with by 
the use of non-military means. 
Generally, one normally tries to prevent rather than repress threats to one's 
own security. The availability of adequate operational means and the belief that 
they will be used where necessary, as well as the manouevres of crisis 
management - for example, lhe preventive deployment of forces such as Ihose 
af the Uniled Slales in Macedonia - normally have a sufficiently dissuasive 
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and coercive effect. This means using the potencial of one's available force 
instead of effectively employing it in arder to attain dissuasive and coercive 
effects as illustrated by Schelling. 
When prevention does not work, the use of force can be judged necessary. 
This is never an end unto itself but foresees a political result, that is the 
reestablishment ar creation of a situation of peace which corresponds to one's 
own interests and values. Military victory has na sense in itself except in its 
psychological effect on the adversary's politicians. Also since it is however 
expensive, the minimum amount possible of violence should be used in arder 
to achieve one's polítical aims. This does not mean that the size of the forces 
in the field should be limited. On the contrary, the larger these are, generally 
speaking, the less violence has to aCLually be used in arder to achieve these 
aims. 
Military force is not to be coinsidered as a panacea. In ethnic conflicts, far 
example, military force can divide two fighting factions, as long as they have 
been grouped in different zones, by presiding over the strip dividing the two. 
It cannot, however, oblige two ethnic groups to live together who do not wish 
to do so. Each armed intervention has its polítical as well as its material costs 
and these must be earefully evaluated berore intervention is decided upon. 
Externai peacemaking forces do not have vital interests to defend and will 
tolerate far fewer losses than the local ethnie groups fighting for power and 
survival. Political consensus for intervention can rapidly change and lead to 
disaster, as has happened in Somalia but as had already happened in Algeria, 
in Vietn.m, in Afghanislan and as could still occur in Bosnia. 
A, Angelo Panebianco, Gian Enrico Rusconi and Carla Maria Santoro, 
among Olhers, have often pointed out, it is not possible for a eountry Iike Italy 
to have a foreign policy without a military policy, without adequate armed 
forces ar, at an even more basic levei, without a cultural concept of the 
legitimacy of employing mililary force in the defence of national interests and 
those of the international community. It is not necessary to stress this point; the 
m.jority of citizens are more than convineed as can be seen by the digni!ied 
behaviour shown on the occasion of the deaths of our soldiers in Somalia. 
Everyone, however, must be convinced of the fact that, just as we cannot 
disarm the police in the fight against orgarnized crime, in today's warld, 
domin.ted as it is by geo-economics and interdependence, a loaded gun often 
c.rries more weight than a full wallet and that • state which does not maintain 
its own soldiers will, sooner ar later, have to maintain those of another. 
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NATIONAL AND CQLLECTIVE SECURITY 
When common security inleresls exisl Ihen defence alliances ar collective 
securily syslems are formed. 
The farmer are permanenl, like lhe Allanlie AlIiance, ar conligenl, as was 
the case in the pas!. Permanenl alliances are directed againsl a precise threat 
which involves vital, permanent and, lherefare, common national interests of 
ali the member states. Such aIliances faresee the existence of mililary inlegra-
tion even in times of peace, aI least sI the levei of systems of command. Since 
lhere is no transfer of sovereignly and, therefore, no automatism ar certainty 
Ihal, at lhe momenl of danger, the slates will keep to Iheir undertakings, 
alliances always make provision for anti-defection ar reciprocal insurance 
mechanisms similar to lhe system of lhe exchange of hostages practised ut to 
modem times. In NATO, for example, lhe presence of a consistenl amount of 
American air-ground forces in the forward defence of Central Europe and the 
deployment of nuclear wapons in Europe guaranteed lhe so-called slrategic 
coupling wilh lhe Uniled Slales. In lhe reorganization of NATO forces, a 
similar reassurance is not possible. A certain cohesion, however, tends to be 
maintained by means of the creation of multi national units and the increase in 
combined farces, such as the multi national AWACS units. 
Security syslems, such as the United Nations ar the CSCE, do nol foresee 
the existence of an adversary who has to be faced as do defence institulions. 
These, instead, contemplate lhe principies of the creation of ad hoc coalitions 
so as to oppose an aggressor who, initially, is one of the member states of the 
system itself. 
This greatly limits the real efficiency of collective security systems which 
have, in effect, so far been almost ineffective. Each state has its own interests, 
diverging perceptions and its own evaluation of the levei of acceptable COSIS, 
losses and risks. 
Mareover, since collective security and stability are public goods and, as 
such, cannot be divided, it follows thal states also benefit from it who in no way 
participate in its production. Ali states are therefore tempted to come up with the 
most diverse reasons for letting olhers act ar, at least, limiting their own 
responsabilities unless, obviously, their own national interests are involved in the 
conflict. They can also be tempted to come to an agreement with lhe enemies of 
lheir own allies so as to oblain advantages in the long ar shorl termo 
This is whal is happening in Yugoslavia, what effectively happened in 
Somalia and what will inevitably happen again in the fulure. 
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With the globalization of information in real time, public opinion will 
continue to vacillate in an entirely unpredictably manner between the most 
megalomaniac calls for intervention and the most defeatist desire not to take 
any risks whatsoever. 
ITALIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY IN THE BIPOLAR AND 
POST BIPOLAR WORLD 
THE COLD WAR PERIOD 
In the bipolar period the existence of a permanent threat to the vital 
interests of ali lhe Western slales caused polities, somelimes including domes-
lic politics, lo be considered as secondary lo security or, if we wish, slralegy, 
The syslem followed the elegant logie of lhe confrontation of blocks and lhe 
technicalities of widespread nuclear dissuasion. There was strong cohesion 
within lhe Alliance resulting from lhe legitimacy of its American leadership, in 
turn derived from the essencial role of the United Stales in lhe survival of lhe 
West. War had been pushed by nuclear weapons beyond lhe borders of Europe, 
Global geopolítical visions dominaled, in particular lhat of conlainmenl of 
Euroasian continenlal power by lhe «marítime» Weslern nations, or lha!. of 
linkage, c10sely connecled lo lhe former concep!. 
Italian politics developed, as Ambassador Incisa di Camerana says, in 
three distincl circles. The Atlanlic circle, which guaranleed our security; the 
European circle which gave us development; and the Mediterranean circle 
which gave us a degree of originalily and lefl space for expression of our 
ecumenical and «third world» missionary nature, an important element in our 
national culture. 
The Armed Forces had an exclusively static lask. They were nol 
complelely de-nalionalized since, on lhe one hand, as lhey were aimed 
principally aI lhe defence of lhe norlh-easlern border, they were less integrated 
in NATO than the German forces. On the other, we have obligatory mililary 
service and therefore the need to overcome the split between majority and 
opposition by appealíng to national concerns lhal could motivale the con-
scripls, whose polítical opinions c1early mirrored those of Italian society in 
general. 
The objectives lo be followed and the resulting defence budgels could be 
delermined with a degree of certainty and by mainly technical calculations in 
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relation to the size of the threat, the priod of warning and the extent of the 
frontier to be defended. 
The military problem had been removed from the national culture and 
political debate, to some extent because it was considered irrelevant and partly 
because studying it in depth would have highlighted the irrenconcilable 
contradiction between, on the one hand, Italy's place in the international 
community and, on the other, the ideological split between the majority and the 
opposition. It was not for nothing that the debate on Euro-missiles had a 
notable effect on the politics of so-called national solidarity and, in the opinion 
of some, was provoked precisely in order to reignite contrast between the 
majority and the opposition. 
Italy's position gave it undoubted benefits, not only because of the 
country's strategic position in the Mediterranean but also because of lhe fear 
that it could slide into neulrality, if not the opposite block even. This 
guaranteed Ilaly the support and solidarity of the West. Italy could have 
contented herself with enjoying the security provided by American soldiers 
and tax-payers without having to pay anything in economic or political terms 
herself, what one could call a market price. Italy could also, as we have said, 
move with impunity and a lack of responsibility, cultivating Messianic ideaIs, 
the legacy 01' the dominant polilical culture againsl which Cesare Bablo had 
already warned us, condemning the tendency lo c1aim a «primacy". or lhe 
«universal mission of the Italians». Security policy was, in effect, delegaled lo 
the United States and this explains the combinalion 01' unease and emotion 
caused at one and the same time by lhe Sigonella incident which saw us in 
opposition to our main ally. 
ITALlAN SECURITY IN THE POST-BIPüLAR WORLD 
Today lhe entire picture is radically difl'erent. Italy can no longer delegale 
to olhers lhe managemenl of its own security policy, neither to the United 
States which has different interests and aims to reduce its responsibilities, nor 
lo Europe which exists only in the imagination and in desires. Italy has lost lhe 
advantage of her position. The unilication of Germany, the disintegration of 
Eastern Europe and the likely extension of the Community to four EFTA 
countries, ali combine to make European integration more problemalical in the 
fields of foreign and security policies. The disappearance of a threal has 
weakened the Iinks in the Atlantic Alliance, notwithstanding lhe continued, 
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notable American presence in Europe which everybody wants also in order to 
maintain European balances. This reduced cohesion has not been totally 
compensated for by attempts to bring the role of NATO up to date with the new 
political-strategic situation with initiatives such as: NACC, Partnership for 
Peace (PFP) and the placing of Allantic military forces and means at the 
disposition of the UNO and the CSCE. 
Geopolitics have fragmented. The world has become multi-polar also in 
terms of strategy and hopes for a new world order have f1oundered. The United 
States do not intend to bear the weight of being the policemen of the world. 
They are moving increasingly towards not so much an impossible isolationism, 
given existing global interdependence, as towards the adoption of a «great 
maritime strategy» of the kind proposed at the start of the century by Corbett 
for the United Kingdom, in opposition to both the theories of continental 
involvement and those «naval» theories which then held sway. 
In this picture, the United States would represent an «hones! itermediary» 
and catalyzer of temporary and contingent alliances, lhus progressively de-
creasing lheir foreign involvement and linking each responsibility to precise 
national interests rather than those of an abstract international communily. 
War has once again beco me an hislorical realily in Europe. From lhe 
south, the Mediterranean is overshadowed by the demographic and Islamic 
bombs which could constitute a threat should weapons of mass destruction 
become available. European integration has been halted, if not actually been 
set back. 
In Europe differing geopolitical views are in conflicl. In contrast to a 
Germanized Europe of «Euroregions» we have that of a Europe of States 
acknowledged by lhe Maastricht Treaty which largely takes up the project for 
a Europe of Nalions proposed by General De Gaulle and Fouchet Plan. 
On a global levei, counterbalancing a French-Gerrnan-Russian axis, the 
basis for Europe as a world power, we have British scepticism in relation to 
European unity, a «Europe in Atlantic sauce» as well as a re-evaluation af 
NATO policy. Today, uncertainty reigns. European integration has not pre-
vented different policies arising in the varying states in relation to the 
Yugoslavian crisis, although it has limited opposition and avoided the growth 
01' tension at the price, however, of inaction. 
The United States have lost a large degree of the interest he had in 
European integration in the fifties. This can be seen in the spread of the 
geopolitical theories of Nicholas Spykman which, unlike those of MacKinder 
that forrned the basis of the Truman doctrine of containment, c1aim that the 
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major threat to American security derives not so much from Russia, the heart 
of the Eurasian continent, as from both European and East Asian Rimlands. 
World stability depends on the ability of the United States to prevent these 
Rimlands from uniting, an event whieh eould give rise to a global power that 
could compete with the United States for world leadership. 
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ITALlAN SECURITY: REALlTY AND 
PROSPECTIVES 
WHICH NATIONAL INTERESTS FOR ITALY'l 
This is not the place to outline in sutlieient detail italian national inte-
rest' and their effeets on seeurity policy ar necessary military eapabilities. 
I will limit myself to merely indieating them as the stimulus for funher 
study. 
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One may say that the principal italian national interests are as follows: 
a. Following a process of European integration which, on the one hand, 
does not destroy the unity of the state and, on the other, does nol 
exclude us from a «board» 01' the principal European powers. This will 
only be possible if we incrcase our weighl within Europe. In lhe 
meantime, we havc every intercst in maintaining a strong balancing 
presenee of the Uniled States bOlh in Cenlral Europe and lhe Mediter-
ranean; 
b. Slimulating a Mediterranean political dimension both of Europe and oI' 
the Atlantic Alliance 50 as not to be exce,sively burdened by problems 
of underdevelopment, stability or seeurity in the area and thus, to a 
eertain extent, compensating for the attraction which Central-Eastern 
Europe is exercising 011 the European Union and on NATO; 
c. Avoiding a situation in which the extension 01' Europe or of NATO 
involves only the Visigrad eountries, thus marginalizing the Balkans 
and South-East Europe and isolating Turkey; 
d. Protecting our interests in Libya, Egypt and Turkey. the link with oil 
resourees in the Caucasus and in Central Asia; 
e. Guaranteeing our full participation in G7 and, possibly, in an enlarged 
UN Security Couneil (but is this worth it?) by continuing to participate 
in international missions aimed at maintaining stability and peace; 
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f. Avoiding a total absorption of the Balkans, Central Europe and the ex-
-USSR by Germany by extending Italy's presence/influence in compe-
tition/cooperation with Germany's and trying to obtain support for our 
actions from the other Western states; 
g. Maintaining open relations with the Maghreb but avoiding being caught 
up in its internaI problems or taking sides th any one of the factions 
fighting for power; 
h. Stimulating the integration into Europe of Italian high-tech industries, 
such as those in the defence sector. However, should our European 
partners dictate excessive conditions, Italy should not hesitate to at-
tempt to extend its cooperation with the United States and Japan, 
possibly even in conflict with European cooperation; 
i. «Ending» as soon as possible the legal suit with Slovenia and Croatia 
50 as not to damage our cooperation with thase countries and continu-
ing to protect adequately those minorities and those «historical rights» 
of ltalian cu!ture in Istria and Oalmatia which we cannot abandon; 
1. Coordinating economic and fiscal policy on a global and not merely 
community scale by modifying also those strategic priorities estab-
lished to date: no longer supporting the impossible objective of the 
standards of Maastricht but, awaiting and in anticipation of a revisi?n 
of the Treaty, relaunching production and employment; 
m. etc. etc .... 
Each interest which, whilst general, should be clearly outlined so as to 
constitute guidelines for foreign policy, should derive from more contingent 
and specific objectives enabling diplomatic activity to negotiate an «exchange 
of interests». For example, in an entirely simplistic if not imaginative way, one 
could think of an agreement with Germany on lhe East to compensate for a 
German support for the Medilerranean area and the Balkans. 
A similar consideration in an interministerial picture could thus render 
explicit the component factors - military, economic, cultural, etc. - of actions 
to be performed so as to achieve these interests; in particular, the qualitative 
and quantitative structures to be pursued by lhe Armed Forces in the context 
of altemative medi um and long term resources. 
The areas of Italian national interests are now basically threefold: Euro-
pean, Mediterranean and global. In Europe, the changes which have occurred 
in the last few years have shifled ltaly's geopolitical centre towards the north-
-east, from westem to central Europe. As a result, the problems of relations 
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with Germany have become crucial, as has cooperation with this country for 
the stability and development of eastern Europe, rich in both human and 
technological resources at low COst. Exploitation of these resources is essencial 
to the reinforcing of our economy in its competition with South East Asia 
which will be extremely difficult. 
The Mediterranean context no longer represents a realistic opportunity for 
the kind of Italian development which could increase our weight in Europe, 
which, after ali, is that which counts. The attraction of Africa, historieal curse 
of Italy's nationalism and colonialism at the end of the nineteenth and start of 
the twentieth century, risks absorbing toa many of our economic and military 
resources and involving us in unsolvable problems. Some, in particular the 
Ambassador Incisa, convincingly maintain that Italy should shift her attention 
from Africa to Latin America which would appear to offer more promising 
opportunities for development. Moreover, the presence of millions of citizens 
of Italian origin should be an element in favour of a relaunching of interesting 
economic and cultural relations etc. 
The Mediterranean, rather than representing a bridge would become a 
barrier. This clearly would not be hermetically sealed given the importance of 
ltalian interests in Libya, Egypt and Turkey, but Mediterranean and Arrican 
policies would no longer be ruled by a missionary spirit but by rigorous 
evaluation of the possible benetits, costs and risks lhey would represent for 
Italy. 
As far as world policy is concerned. ltaly should perform above ali the 
role of «mercantile state», fully re-evaluating the global policies of pre-
unification Italian states, especially the maritime republics. In a certain sense, 
Italy should follow a foreign policy similar to that of Japan, aimed, that is to 
say, at the development and support of commerce without limiting ourselves 
to a purely neo-mercantile vision of the new field of geo-economics. The 
minar overall importance of military force in the post-bipolar world and the 
greater economic weight of Italy clearly represent a favourable element to be 
exploited. Instead, we must firmly distance ourselves from a foreign policy 
which deals in those generalized universal values that, in the past, provided a 
convenient smoke-screen behind which amateurism, inability, improvisation 
and disarganization cou Id hide. 
The government should define its interests more clearly and make the 
effort to involve public opinion in the debate on foreign policy. It could find 
itself facing difficult choices should contrasts arise between Germany and the 
United States, especially if the former was attracted excessively to Mitteleuropa 
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and the more western of the ex-Soviet republics. In this case, above ali, the 
costs of foreign policy and ltalian securily would inevitably rise and could not 
be confronted withoul strong internai consensus. Only in lhis way could we 
reduce the danger of brutal wavering belween interventionist furor and the 
inability to run risks and the eternal attempts to mediate between the proposals 
of others in the absence of any ability to come up with our own. 
THE CONSEQUENCES DF NOT DEFINING NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Here I will merely list the consequences since they have been fully dealt 
with in the previous sections: 
• a lack of political responsibility and, therefore, of democratic control; 
• a waste of resources (including those of credibility and«image») in 
useJess initiatives; 
• a reduced impact of ltaly on the international scene and reduced ability 
to uphold her interests; 
• a lack in coordination hetween various policies, for example between 
fiscal and foreign trade policies in favour of exports; between forejgn 
investment and a reduction in unemployment; therefore, a lack of control 
between the various sectors and a limited understanding by those 
responsible for one sector of the needs of the others. Without the means 
to discuss and clarify these together, areas of interference cannot be 
identified. This is also exacerbated by lhe partition of responsibilities by 
subject, rather than geographical area currently existing in the Foreign 
Ministry organization; 
• duplication of conflicting and uncoordinated foreign policies; a levelling 
effect compared to previous and historical constants; 
• a reduced ability to plan for the future; reactive, improvised and not 
strategic decision-making; 
• vagueness and lack of effectiveness; 
• greater vulnerability to media campaigns, often if not always directed by 
particular interests; 
• a tendency to levei out to the lowest common denominator; 
• grealer space: for lobbying, for a patronage system, (for example in the 
destination of personnel to lucrative and prestigious posts as lIalian 
representatives abroad ar in international organizations), for overween-
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ing ambition, for ideological stances, for «being presenl», and for «go-
-gelting» pseudo-decisional stances; 
• a prevalence af regional interests and views ave r national Olles; 
• the use of foreign policy in favour of internai political competition in 
terms bOI h of action (for example, aimed at weakening the govemment) 
and of ommission (for example, not using the potencial of the ltalian 
communities abroad for fear of damaging one's own political position in 
ltaly). 
SECURITY POLlCY AND THE ARMED FORCES 
Security policy should be adapted to foreign policy, in relation to which 
it should have a subordinate function. Foreign policy will not bow down to the 
logic 01' security policy as occurred in lhe bipolar world. The Armed Forces 
will no longer have to perform the static task of defending the territory in the 
conlext of collective dissuasion of the AlIiance under American leadership. 
They must guarantee an adequate presence of our country in western or 
international foreign interventions aimed at the solution af crises and contlicts, 
as well as protecting lhe maritime flank 01' the peninsula and lhe territory 
against threats deriving from the proliferation 01' missiles and weapons 01' mass 
destruction. They must be capable of acting also in a purely national context 
in lhe case af minor crises, such as lhe intervention in Ruanda to save lhe lives 
01' nalional subjects, and must also ensure a qualified presence in the various 
lasks which they may be called on to perform, from providing international 
observers to intervention in cases af natural ar technological disasters, both at 
home and abroad. 
Qualitied does not only mean 01' an equal qualily as those of other 
European Armed Forces. lt also means polarized into those sectors which are 
most lacking in international interventions, above ali light infantry units and 
systems of eommand, control, communications, survelliance and target acqui-
sition. Ali forces must possess fulI strategic and tactical mobility and be 
capable of very rapid deployment. They must, therefore, possess total opera-
tional readiness. The knowledgc of languages wilI represent one of the most 
important indieators of readiness for the Armed Forces to perform their new 
tasks. 
lt is far more difficult to determine the dimensions that the Armed Forces 
should have. The quantitative detinition of force goals can no longer be purely 
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technical as in the times of the bipolar world. Fareign intervention is not the 
resull of an obligation but of an auto no maus political choice. It is, in a certain 
sense, optional, deriving from the role which Italy decides to play as a result 
of her national interests. The controlaI' frontiers and air and sea spaee eannol 
be abandoned, nor ean the monitoring oI' the strategic situation in areas 
considered af criticai importance far security, the defence 01' the territory 
against missile attacks, the defence 01' the freedom oI' lhe se as and strategic 
supply, the availability 01' special forces for the rescue 01' Italian nationals 
abroad ar the ability to reconstitute the main defenec forces through mobiliza-
tion in the albeit remate possibility 01' a new land threat lo the national 
territory. 
But to these irremissible requirements must be added effective participa-
tion in multi national missions. 
Given our membership of the AlIianee and our interest in aetive partici-
pation in European integration, one could presume lhat the !talian ability for 
externai military intervention should be in the range I'rom hall' to two-thirds 
that of other principal European countries. Clearly, one cannot do everything 
immediately. Time and rigorous planning will be needed and the necessary 
resourees must be supplied. A teehnological and industrial military policy will 
also be essencial lo enliven the industrial base weakened by a reduction in 
arders, the block 01' exports and the laek of stimulus far lhat qualitative 
improvement which ean on]y lead to intcrnational compctition Of cooperation. 
CONCLUDlNG REMARKS 
In arder for such an abilily lo be meaningful, lhal is, lo be 01' concrele use 
to the nation, greater general cooperation is needed, above ali between the 
Foreign and Defence Ministries, but also belween lhe Ministries for Foreign 
Trade, Finance etc. in such a way as to prevent our efforts and resourees aimed 
at intervention from being rendered largely useless, as happened in Somalia, 
in Albania and in Mozambique. This could only occur if our interests and the 
aims 01' national foreign policy are clearly defined and eaeh intervention is 
secn in an organic and coherent overall polítical context with precisely 
evaluated priorities. 
In arder to achieve ali this, as already suggested - apart from internai 
restructuring of the country, the reacquisition 01' a sense 01' the state, recogni-
tion 01' the legitimacy 01' using force i n arder to protect national and collective 
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interests and the preparation of institutional organizations and operative and 
intelligence means - we must recreate the cultural conditions that serve as bOlh 
the premise and the stimulus for serious debate of both foreign and military 
policy. We must abandon the empty ambition of ecumenical debates on the 
different nature, the primacy and the mission of ltaly in the world. We must 
instead adjust our efforts and resources, costs and risks to contingent aims 
deriving from the rigorous pursuit of national interests and their priorities in 
the context also of those politieal resourees that ean be dedieated to foreign 
poliey. 
This is a task which is also a civil and, without being rhetarical, patriotic 
duty af diplomats and the members of the Armed Forces. It must also invalve 
the academic world, media operators and teachers, who have so far shown too 
little interests in real problems, in the essentials and prospectives of foreign 
policy and national security and their impact on the growth of prosperity and 
cohesion within the «ltalian national system». 
Carla Jeall 
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